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Common research on decision-making investigates non-interdependent situations, i.e., “games 
against nature”. However, humans are social beings and many decisions are made in social set-
tings, where they mutually influence each other, i.e., “strategic games”. Mathematical game the-
ory gives a benchmark for rational decisions in such situations. The strategic character makes 
psychological decision-making more complex by introducing the outcomes for others as an addi-
tional attribute of that situation; it also broadens the field for potential coordination and coopera-
tion problems. From an evolutionary point of view, behavior in strategic situations was at a com-
petitive edge. This paper demonstrates that even in games against nature, people sometimes de-
cide as if they were in a strategic game; it outlines theoretical and empirical consequences of 
such a shift of the frame. It examines whether some irrationalities of human decision-making 
might be explained by such a shift in grasping the situation. It concludes that the mixed strategies 
in games against nature demand a high expertise and can only be found in situations where these 
strategies improve the effects of minimax-strategies that are used in cases of risk-aversion. 
                                        
1   This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions received during presentations at the Max Planck 
Institute for Research on Collective Goods. I thank Arndt Bröder, who was a tremendous support for this  
paper. I also thank Ben Newell and Christoph Engel for very constructive suggestions, as well as Darrell  
Arnold and Brian Cooper for the helpful linguistic assistance.  2 
Decision-Making Revisited: Individual and strategic decisions 
It is reasonable to assume that the evolution of human decision-making modules was triggered 
by competitive advantages resulting from mutual cooperation (cf., Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). 
However, common psychological research on decision-making investigates mainly situations no 
social interdependencies - the individual makes a decision on his own. Within this research, it 
has been common to distinguish two branches of decision theory. Descriptive decision theory is 
concerned with how decision-makers make decisions, whereas prescriptive decision theory de-
velops normative concepts that identify optimal decisions that should be made in order to be ra-
tional. In both branches, decisions under certainty are distinguished from decisions under uncer-
tainty.  
The interest in problems under certainty in prescriptive decision theory was mainly triggered by 
complex problems; here, the complexity of the problem may lie in limitations of the cognitive 
capacity or in principal characteristics of the problem itself, such as the NP-completeness
2 of a 
problem, or both. Given the NP-completeness of a problem, a general algorithmic solution for 
any problem-size becomes impossible; consequently, heuristic approaches have to be found if 
the problem itself is big enough.
3 In descriptive decision theory, an important string of research 
is concerned with multi-attribute decision-making, although multi-attribute decisions under un-
certainty also play an important role. Given the capacity limitations of cognitive processes, 
multi-attribute decision-making under certainty is a relevant issue. However, many of these 
models can also be applied to situations under uncertainty. 
As already mentioned above, psychological literature about decision-making usually focuses on 
situations where the individual’s decision is outside of a social context, i.e., the decision has no 
influence on the outcomes of other people, and others have no influence on the outcomes of the 
individual. Tagging the situation under uncertainty as a “game” in the sense of mathematical 
game theory, psychological decision-theory is usually concerned with “games against nature”, 
where certain events happen independently of the individual’s decisions (for instance if it rains 
or not), and the individual’s outcome is determined by the event and the individual’s decision – 
for instance either the individual chose an umbrella or not. Subjective expected utility theory 
(SEU theory in the following) plays a prominent role within this context of games against nature. 
However, humans are social beings; and many decisions are made in social settings, where they 
mutually influence each other, i.e., humans often have to decide in “strategic games”. 
 
                                        
2   Easy, or tractable, problems can be solved by computer algorithms that run in polynomial time run time. The 
run time is not longer than a polynomial function of the problem size (like, for instance, number of objects to 
be sorted).  np-complete problems, however, take more than polynomial time, i.e. with growing problem size 
the run-time increases severely. Many significant computer science problems belong to this category— e.g., 
the travelling salesman problem, or chess. 
3   Indeed, the investigation of NP-complete problems was an important step on the path from traditional com-
puter science to artificial intelligence, a predecessor discipline of cognitive science, and the investigation of 
heuristics is an important domain within artificial intelligence. 3 
Many of the situations that are grasped as games against nature could be grasped as strategic 
games as well. In the following it will be shown that such a shift in view has important conse-
quences and may lead to different conclusions. Specifically, framing a situation as a social situa-
tion leads to the apposition of at least one more attribute, because besides the own outcome the 
consideration of the outcome of an additional person or a group comes along. As a result, many 
situations that are well-known in SEU theories may look different from the point of view of a 
strategic game. But this change is not a mere enrichment of the surface of the situation, but the 
theoretic solutions in such situations may differ as well. Therefore, it is also reasonable to as-
sume that that a distinct view of the situation in the individual’s mind should lead to different 
outcomes in their decision. 
The following two sections will theoretically compare the classical SEU view with the view of a 
strategic game. The fourth section introduces the concept of mixed strategies in strategic games 
with an empirical example (tennis). The fifth section reflects upon the consequences when mixed 
strategies that are adequate in strategic games are used in games against nature. The section is 
followed by an empirical example (section 6) that fits such a case where the mixed strategy solu-
tion describes well the behavior of the actors in a game against nature (offshore-fishery). This 
example was originally described as a clear case where SEU is adequate. However, a subsequent 
theoretic analysis demonstrated that, even in games against nature, mixed strategies may help to 
overcome uncertainty. After these theoretic insights, the question is posed whether people apply 
mixed strategies in laboratory experiments about decisions against nature and where these strate-
gies might make sense (section 7). The review suggests that mixed strategies are hard to learn; as 
a result, they cannot be observed in common laboratory experiments without a high repetition 
rate of the decision task. 
Decision-Making under Uncertainty: SEU Theories 
Typically, in decision theory the problem consists in making a choice between different alterna-
tives. If the outcome for each alternative is known, the decision is made under certainty. If not, 
then the situation is made under non-certainty, or uncertainty in the broad sense.
4 
                                        
4   Non-certainty can be divided into further categories, such as risk and uncertainty (cf. Hansson, 2005, p. 26). 
This conceptual frame originated with Knight (1921), who proposed to reserve the term “uncertainty” for 
cases where the degree of uncertainty cannot be quantified (i.e., uncertainty in the narrow sense, also known 
as “Knightean uncertainty”). Decisions under risk refer to the quantifiable cases, i.e., cases where typically 
probabilities for the different outcomes are given or can be estimated. This distinction between certainty, un-
certainty and risk corresponds to the traditional and prominent literature in decision-making (e.g., Luce & 
Raiffa, 1957, p. 13) and is also used in the following sections. 
  Of course, many problems fall between the categories of risk and uncertainty, as defined by Luce and Raiffa 
(1957). Often, we do not know the precise probabilities, but nevertheless the probabilities are not completely 
unknown. It is also common to use the term “uncertainty” in such situations, and to name a situation under 
strict uncertainty a situation “under ignorance” (cf. Hansson, 2005, p. 27; Alexander, 1975, p. 365). Krizner 
(1994) introduces the case of unknown problem spaces. For the purpose of clarity, this terminology and these 
distinctions will not be used in the following sections. The following arguments concentrate on the two poles 
of uncertainty with, on the one hand, Knightean uncertainty and, on the other, uncertainty with given prob-
abilities. 4 
The major paradigms for decisions under risk are expected value theory (EV theory) and SEU 
theory (subjective expected utility theory). According to EV theory, the alternative with the 
greatest EV should be chosen. The expected value of a choice X is calculated with: 
∑ = =
n
i i ix p X E
1 ) (  (1) 
The expected value of a choice X is calculated by multiplying the probabilities for different out-
comes in nature pi by the resulting payoff in this state of the nature xi. Considering either subjec-
tive probabilities for a subject j (instead of objective probabilities) or utilities (instead of objec-
tive outcomes), or both, extends the scope to SEU theory (cf. Savage 1954): 
) ( ) (
1 ∑ = =
n
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Given an option X and n different possible outcomes in nature, SEU is calculated by multiplying 
the utilities for subject j uj(xi) by the subjective probabilities pij. Again, the decision-maker is 
assumed to choose an option X, with the highest expected utility. 
However, it is important to note that the probabilities are “fixed”, i.e., the respective probabilities 
of the outcomes are independent of the subject’s decision. This is what characterizes “games 
against nature”: A lottery is a good example of a game against nature. In contrast, in strategic 
games a chosen alternative may influence others, and the choices of others have impacts on 
one’s own outcome: recent examples of bookmaking demonstrated that customers were in the 
belief to play a game against nature (like a lottery), whereas in fact there was a manipulation and 
therefore they were playing a strategic game. Endogenous (instead of exogenous) uncertainty 
arises in strategic games, where the outcome depends on social interaction (cf. Heinemann, Na-
gel & Ockenfels 2004). This aspect is usually not considered in the relevant literature on psycho-
logical decision-making, as will be demonstrated with the following example. 
Strategic Decision-Making Under Uncertainty 
In a text book about decision-making (Jungermann, Pfister & Fischer, pp. 201-214), the follow-
ing example of one application of SEU theories can be found. A grandson is not sure about the 
testament of his grandfather, and he does not know whether he will inherit a lot of money from 
him. Depending on whether he will be rich (if he inherits the money) or not (if he does not in-
herit the money), the consequences of living in Hamburg (a city that is expensive, but with very 
high quality of life) or Dortmund (a city that is cheap, but with moderate quality of life) will be 
different. They are given in the following matrix. As it is common in decision theories, the dif-
ferent states of nature (i.e., the situation in which either the grandson will inherit the money and 
be rich or the one in which he will not inherit the money and be poor) are given in the columns. 
The different options of the grandson (moving to Hamburg or staying in Dortmund) are given in 
the row. The outcomes of the different decisions with corresponding utilities of the grandson are 
inscribed in the cells of the matrix (cf. table 1): 5 
Table 1 
Outcomes from the SEU point of view 
 
 E 1 Inherits money  E2 Does not inherit money 
X Hamburg  x1 (rich in Hamburg) 
u(x1) = 1.0 
x2 (poor in Hamburg) 
u(x2) = 0.0 
Y Dortmund  y1 (rich in Dortmund) 
u(y1) = 0.7 
y2 (poor in Dortmund) 
u(y2) = 0.3 
 
This example is discussed as a game against nature, and – according to SEU theory – the choice 
should be made that maximizes the expected utility of a choice: 
( ) ) ( ), (
1 1 ∑ ∑ = =
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i i j ij
n
i i j ij y u p x u p max  (3) 
In the example, the grandson can either choose X or Y; and according to SEU, he should choose 
that option that maximizes his expected utility. In the given situation the grandson should live in 
Hamburg as long as the probability to inherit the money is greater than ½, and live in Dortmund 
if the probability is below that. The probability p = ½ for both events E1 and E2 provides the 
point of indifference between the two choices, because ½(0.7)+½(0.3 = ½(1)+½(0) = 0.5. If the 
probability of inheriting the money is above ½, the grandson should choose Hamburg; otherwise, 
he should choose Dortmund. The grandson could also be risk averse and try to maximize his 
minimal payoffs by using a maximin strategy: maximize the minimal gain. In this case, inde-
pendently of the probabilities of the different outcomes, the grandson would stay in Dortmund, 
ensuring him a minimal utility of 0.3. 
At first glance, these seem to be rather convincing approaches, but it could well be that the 
grandson thinks that he is in a strategic situation, such that the probability of inheriting the 
money depends on whether he stays near his grandfather (i.e., he chooses Dortmund) or whether 
he moves (i.e., to Hamburg). For instance, it could be that his grandfather will become angry if 
the grandson moves to Hamburg, and the probability of getting the inheritance will be lower than 
if the grandson stays in Dortmund. This strategic view of the situation introduces a second at-
tribute; namely, the payoffs of his grandfather become relevant. The grandson also has to con-
sider his grandfather’s utilities in the matrix. In other words, looking at a decision situation from 
the point of view of a strategic game can be understood as changing it from a one-attribute deci-
sion-making situation to a two-attribute decision-making situation. Let’s name the corresponding 
utilities for the grandfather v. The corresponding matrix might be depicted as follows:  6 
Table 2  
Outcomes from the strategic games point of view 
 
  E1 Inherits money  E2 Does not inherit money 
X Hamburg  x1 (rich in Hamburg) 
u(x1) = 1.0 
v(x1) = 0.0 
x2 (poor in Hamburg) 
u(x2) = 0.0 
v(x2) = 0.1 
Y Dortmund  y1 (rich in Dortmund) 
u(y1) = 0.7 
v(y1) = 1.0 
y2 (poor in Dortmund) 
u(y2) = 0,3 
u(y2) = 0.7 
 
In strategic games, it also often makes a difference whether the decisions are made sequentially 
or simultaneously. In a simultaneous game, the grandson could take the risk and choose X,
 5 
whereas he should not choose X as a first mover, because in this case, his grandfather would 
maximize his utility by choosing E2, ending up with a utility v(x2) = 0.1, which is better for him 
than v(x1) = 0.0. Therefore, in a sequential game, the grandson should choose Dortmund. This 
would lead to a utility of 0.7 for him and 1.0 for his grandfather. 
Mixed Strategies 
But what about the situation when both decisions are made simultaneously and are irreversible? 
In this case, a mixed strategy solution may be useful. Although it can be calculated for strategic 
situations as in the example provided before, for the sake of simplicity let us first consider zero- 
or constant-sum games, i.e., games where the benefit of one actor corresponds to a loss of the 
other such that the sum of all players’ outcomes is the same in any of the possible cases (i.e., 
cells of the matrix): The gain of the proponent entails the loss of the opponent, and vice versa. In 
this case, the matrix of outcomes reduces in complexity, because the indication of one of the two 
actors’ outcomes and the indication of the constant sum is sufficient for the representation of the 
situation.
6 A tennis game can serve as an example of such a situation, where the server has to 
decide whether to play to the forehand or the backhand of the opponent. The opponent decides 
whether he should expect to be served to the forehand side or the backhand side. The opponent 
has a better chance of a good return if he expects the ball on the side the server is serving to. 
However, the backhand is usually weaker than the forehand, and this is why the chance that the 
server will serve to the backhand is higher than the chance that he will serve to the forehand. The 
following matrix could characterize such a situation (cf. table 3).  
                                        
5  However, this is not an equilibrium solution. The mixed strategy solution for this game that makes the 
Grandfather indifferent between E1 and E2, is to choose Hamburg with p = 0.75. The calculus for such solu-
tions will be introduced below. 
6   This makes constant-sum games look similar to games against nature, but still it is a strategic situation where 
the actor has to consider that the other reacts on what he chooses. An explanation follows below. 7 
Table 3 
Table of successful attack/defense rates in a tennis game. 
 
  Expect forehand  Expect backhand 









As mentioned above, this matrix is redundant and one value per cell (instead of two) would be 
sufficient, because the success rate of the proponent is 1-  the failing rate of the opponent (this is 
precisely the characteristic of zero-sum games). Nevertheless, it is not an SEU situation, but a 
strategic one. The solution for the server is to play such that the opponent becomes indifferent 
about expecting a serve to the forehand as opposed to the backhand. Any other strategy would 
raise the success rate of the opponent (and decrease the success rate of the server). Naming the 
probability that a ball will be served to the forehand side p(Sf) and the probability that a ball will 
be served to the backhand side p(Sb) = 1-p(Sf), the indifference point (and equilibrium) Eq is 
found by calculating the following:
7 
() ( ) 3 . 0 ) ( 1 4 . 0 ) ( 6 . 0 ) ( 1 2 . 0 ) ( Sf p Sf p Sf p Sf p Eq − + = − + =  (4) 
The solution of this equation is 0.6, meaning that the server should serve forehand with a prob-
ability 0.6. The value of that game, i.e., the success rate for the server, is 0.36 if he uses that 
strategy.  
Walker and Wooders (2001) applied the MSE theory (Mixed strategy equilibrium theory) to data 
from professional tennis matches. The serve in tennis can be described as a 2x2 mixed-strategy 
game. Walker and Wooders obtained data from matches between world-class tennis players, who 
should be expert in the strategic subtleties of this game. The way they play corresponds quite 
closely to the mixed-strategy predictions. Thus, the empirical evidence to date indicates that 
mixed strategy predictions may be effective in explaining and predicting behavior in strategic 
situations when the competitors are experts, and that it is less effective when the competitors are 
novices (cf. Walker & Wooders, 2001 and 2006). 
Mixed Strategies in Games Against Nature 
Now, taking the situation in table 3, let us compare the results of a minimax-strategy with the 
result of MSE. In cases where one and the same situation is repeated many times, by making use 
of a mixed strategy, the success rate increases from 0.30 – the solution of a pure minimax-
                                        
7   A comprehensible explanation for the derivation of that formula can be found in Straffin (1993). 8 
strategy – to 0.36: In equation 4, we calculated that a probability mix of 0.6 for serving to the 
forehand (p(Sf) = 0.6) and 0.4 for serving to the backhand (p(Sb) = 0.4) makes the opponent in-
different as to whether he expects that a forehand will be served or expecting that a backhand 
will be served. According to a pure minimax strategy, the server would always serve to the 
backhand (and the opponent would ideally always expect that). In this case, the “payoff”, or suc-
cess-rate, for the server is 0.3 (cf. table 3). However, by choosing the calculated probability mix, 
the expected “payoff” of the server is at least 0.36, independent of the behavior of the opponent.
8 
This insight leads to interesting consequences with respect to games against nature: Even in 
games against nature it can make sense to use mixed strategies, although games against nature 
are not strategic situations. It makes sense if an individual is risk averse and in a situation of 
(Knightean) uncertainty, i.e., where the probabilities for different outcomes in nature are not 
known, and where either the situation is repeated for many times or the choices can be split up in 
accordance with the mixed-strategy solution (like for instance in portfolios, where one can put 
36% in A and 64% in B). Therefore, the mixed-strategy solution may be a good improvement of 
a minimax-strategy in games against nature. 
Above that, in situations with Knightean uncertainty, it would be impossible to apply SEU (in-
stead of minimax). By making use of the mixed-strategy solution, the actor decides on the (im-
plicit) presumption that nature would try to fool him and be completely against him. Although 
the presumption sounds ridiculous, the decision itself is not at all! This way of making use of a 
mixed strategy can be grasped as a maximin strategy under complete uncertainty, and the appli-
cation leads to an insensitivity about the wrong estimations of risks. In other words: the opponent 
(or nature
9) may do what he/it wants; the actor can (still) be guaranteed not to fall under the ex-
pected value of the mixed strategy (0.36 in the strategic tennis case above). Of course, this is not 
true for a single trial, but as already mentioned above it concerns the expected result in the long 
run, or the case when a decision can be split up simultaneously in many sub-decisions. 
Empirical evidence for mixed strategies in games against nature 
In the literature, there is also some empirical evidence for the use of such a strategy in a game 
against nature, which implicitly leads to optimized risk-averse behavior under the assumption of 
complete uncertainty. In an anthropological study, Davenport (1960) observed that fishing crews 
adopted their fishing strategies very near to the game-theoretic mixed-strategy solution. The fish-
ing grounds were divided into inside and outside banks, and the captains of the canoes could 
adopt three different fishing strategies: inside (put all pots on the inside banks), outside (put all 
pots on the outside banks) and in-out (put some pots on the inside banks and some pots on the 
outside). The yields for the three different strategies depend on whether dangerous currents come 
                                        
8    This can be calculated by putting the calculated probability mix in equation 4 and calculating the 
value: 36 . 0 3 . 0 * 4 . 0 4 . 0 * 6 . 0 6 . 0 * 4 . 0 * 2 . 0 * 6 . 0 = + = = Eq  
9   So far, we have considered the situation of a strategic game. The illustration fort his point in a game against 
nauture follows below. 9 
up or not (cf. table 4). According to Davenport’s game-theoretic analysis in mixed strategies, it is 
optimal (in mixed strategies) to have 67% inside and 33% in-out. Actually, 69% followed the 
inside strategy and 31% the in-out strategy. Please note that in this example it is possible to split 
the choices, and therefore the mixed strategy will always guarantee the minimal gain that is cal-
culated in the mixed-strategy solution. 
Table 4 
The payoff table for the fishermen according to Davenport (1960)/Straffin (1993). 
 
   Current 
     Run  Not Run 
   Inside  17.3  11.5 
Fishermen Outside  -4.4  20.6 
   In-Out  5.2  17.0 
 
But why should the fishermen make use of the mixed-strategy solution? The probabilities that 
dangerous currents may come up are well known, with a 25% chance of a “run” and a 75% 
chance of “no run”. Therefore, it is also possible to calculate a solution with SEU theory. Ac-
cording to this solution, the expected value would be maximized if all fishermen fish outside. It 
would be 14.35. The expected value in case of mixed strategies is only 13.3, independent of the 
current’s probability to run.  
In this example, a further advantage of the mixed-strategy solution in games against nature be-
comes obvious. Compared to mixed strategies, SEU is very risky: on days when the currents run 
and all fishermen are outside as the SEU suggests, the fishermen will suffer losses. If losses 
loom larger than gains, or if people are risk-averse respectively, it is better to make use of the 
mixed-strategy solution. Risky choices are choices that tolerate a higher variance in the out-
comes and correspondingly one cannot be sure about one’s concrete outcome. By making use of 
mixed strategies in this example the security level of 13.3 is guaranteed in any case.
10 
Let us summarize some insights with respect to decision-making: Whereas SEU may maximize 
expected payoffs, a mixed strategy is an insurance against errors in the estimates of the prob-
abilities. It is the safe harbor and even optimal in scenarios with complete uncertainty. Therefore, 
making use of mixed strategies may help to avoid dropping below important thresholds, as we 
will see in the following example about financial assets.
11 
                                        
10    Readers who are interested in the calculation of different solutions in Davenport’s example should compare 
the excellent and lucid presentation in Straffin, 1993 (pp. 23-27). 
11   Again, please note that the thresholds are expected values and the outcome of random processes, such that in 
short time spans the strategy may fall below the threshold, but in the long run this becomes more and more 
unlikely. 10 
The considerations given so far are not merely theoretical, but they have consequences in the 
consideration of common SEU strategies. The following example demonstrates that it may make 
sense to apply corresponding portfolio strategies, where “nature” is an efficient market. Let us 
assume that we have a sum of money that we can divide up into two different investments: in an 
annuity fund and in a risky fund. The expected payoffs for the upcoming investment period will 
depend on the developments of the market, either with growth or stagnation (cf. table 5). 
Table 5 
A payoff table for investment decisions. 
 
  E1: Stagnation  E2: Growth 
X (Bonds)  15  14 
Y (risky funds)  -5  40 
 
According to a pure minimax strategy, in this situation one should choose X, which provides a 
security level of 14 units. However, by making use of a mixed strategy, this security level can be 
raised up to 14.56 units. Solving the following equation provides the solution: 
15 pX - 5pY = 14 pX  + 40pY → 15 pX -5(1- pX)= 14 pX + 40(1- pX)  (5) 
It yields p = 45/46, such that, according to a mixed strategy, 97.83% of the assets should be in-
vested in bonds.
12 The secure gain for the investor from this strategy is about 14.57. According 
to SEU, the following term should be maximized: 
max(15 pO1 + 14pO2, -5pO1 + 40pO2)   (6) 
There are also some formal relations between the mixed-strategy solution and solutions found in 
SEU. The solution of the mixed strategy shows the point at which the investor making use of 
SEU should change his investment from the bonds to the risky funds: i.e., according to SEU, if 
pO1<0.4348, then the investor should choose the risky option. 
However, it does not always make sense to make use of mixed strategies in such situations 
against nature. A graphic representation of the situation reveals an easy way to see whether mak-
ing use of a mixed strategy makes sense in a given situation (cf. figure 1). We plot the different 
events of nature on the abscissa, the payoffs on the ordinate, and represent the choices in differ-
ent lines. Given such a graphic representation of the decision situation it only makes sense to use 
a mixed strategy if the lines cross between the different outcomes and if one of the lines has a 
positive slope and the other line has a negative slope (cf. figure 1). Otherwise it makes sense to 
use pure strategies, because in this case either one strategy dominates another or the risk-averse 
                                        
12   According to this calculation, nature “optimizes” if pE1 = 20/46, such that in 43.48% of the cases, it should 
choose E1. However, as it is a game against nature, the interpretation of this result hardly makes sense. 11 
solution is the pure minimax solution, – or both (i.e., when there is no crossing and both lines 




















Figure 1. A graphical representation of the decision situation in table 5. 
 
To summarize so far: It is worth thinking about mixed strategies as decision routines aiming to 
overcome uncertainty, even in situations against nature. From a historian’s point of view, this 
might even be obvious: traditionally, many cultures played strategically with nature – they quar-
reled with their gods. It seems rather that “nature” is a modern invention that replaced strategic 
decision-making with and against the gods, who arranged one’s fate (cf. Snell 1953). 
Experimental Data Revisited: Do People Apply mixed Strategies in 
Games against Nature? 
The arguments given so far provide good theoretic reasons for why playing strategically against 
nature can make sense and may even be rational in cases of Knightean uncertainty. However, 
besides the Davenport example, is it plausible to assume that such strategies can often be empiri-
cally found in decision-making contexts? There are already a number of experimental designs on 
decision-making in which it would make sense to make use of mixed strategies, although the 
experiments were not conceived for this purpose. One class of such experiments are experiments 
on probability matching. Revisiting such results might help to answer the empirical question 
about the use of mixed strategies in games against nature. Typically, in such experiments about 
probability matching, subjects have to choose between two options, for instance, red and green. 
After their decision, an outcome is determined randomly. The experiment is repeated for many 
rounds, and the probabilities of the outcomes are held constant. In case of a match between the 
choice and the outcome, the subject receives a payoff (cf. table 6). 12 
Table 6 
A symmetric payoff table used in probability-matching experiments. 
 








According to rational choice (and SEU), if the payoff matrix is symmetric with respect to the two 
different errors and hits, subjects should choose that option that has a higher probability to occur. 
Only in cases where the probabilities (and the payoffs) for both outcomes are equal can subjects 
choose whatever they want. However, it is a typical empirical result that many subjects fail at 
this task, and one common error is that subjects engage in probability-matching instead; i.e., if 
the probability for red is 0.9 and the probability for green is 0.1, then subjects’ rates of choices of 
red and green correspond to these probabilities instead of always choosing red. The use of strate-
gies is dependent on the task, like whether balls are drawn from an urn or whether a die is rolled 
(cf. Gal & Baron 1996). On a global level (taking both tasks together), Gal and Baron found that 
about 68% of the subjects’ answers were correct (they always chose red); about 20% almost al-
ways chose red but they sometimes chose green (although green was chosen with a relative fre-
quency lower than 0.1); about 10% chose the matching strategy; and about 2% chose half-half. 
The main purpose of their study was to re-examine people’s understanding of optimality in such 
repeated simple choices. The argument in the paper at hand enriches their re-examination, pro-
viding an additional reason that has not been brought up in discussions about this issue so far: 
although people may deliberatively reason that it is ridiculous to assume that urns or dies behave 
strategically, they might at least have such a fear and behave correspondingly.
13  
Schul, Mayo, Burnstein and Yahalom (2007, p. 91) demonstrate that people use different strate-
gies in dependence of these situations: “We assume that when they have to predict outcomes that 
are attributed to non-human causes, people acknowledge their ignorance and try to focus on what 
is most diagnostic. However, when events are attributed to human agency, they believe that noth-
ing is arbitrary and that one can understand the decision situation well enough to eliminate error. 
If so, then people should behave differently when an uncertainty is attributed to chance (a non-
human agency) or to deception (a human agency).” In their experiments, they find that individu-
als who attribute uncertainty to deception (instead of attributing it to chance) are less likely to 
adopt the optimal rule-based strategy. However, they overlook the fact that, in cases of decep-
                                        
13   There are full of examples with confusions of games against nature with strategic games (and vice versa), 
such as the belief that a curse may have a negative impact on others. Magical thinking is a well-known phe-
nomenon both in anthropology, clinical psychology and developmental psychology. The examples given so 
far suggest that some people may have such magical thinking in the context of rolling a dice or drawing lots 
from an urn, but also go beyond that by demonstrating that in some situations there is a lot of rationality in 
such magical thinking. 13 
tion, minimax provides a strategy that guarantees a security level. Their argument is that, under 
fear of deception, individuals attempt to understand their interaction partners so that they can 
decipher their strategies (Schul et al., 2007, p. 95). In contrast to this point and under the point of 
view of mixed strategies, it could also well be that people experience a feeling of not  really be-
ing able to decipher the strategies of others. Nevertheless, they can improve their results and can 
be less vulnerable by making themselves both unpredictable and by considering their own pay-
offs and the payoffs of the opponent. 
So, at first glance, a strategy like probability matching might reflect the idea that subjects make 
use of mixed strategies in this case. With this view, in cases of identical payoffs for the two dif-
ferent hits and identical payoffs for the two different errors that may occur in the decision situa-
tion, the mixed-strategy solution is always to choose both options with a probability of ½, inde-
pendent of the knowledge about base rates. Asymmetric choice rates depend on asymmetries in 
the payoffs, i.e., if the two different hits and/or the two different errors have different payoffs. 
Therefore, the much more severe deviation that we would expect from a mixed-strategy point of 
view can be observed in experimental data on probability matching in asymmetric payoff matri-
ces (cf. table 7).  
Table 7 
An asymmetric payoff table used in probability-matching experiments. The numbers in brackets 
give the presumed payoffs of the opponent, if the situation is seen as a zero-sum game. 
 
  IS LEFT  IS RIGHT 
WANT LEFT 
(WL) 
2 , (-2)  0, (0) 
WANT RIGHT 
(WR) 
0, (0)  1, (-1) 
 
In this decision situation, subjects were asked to play the following virtual matrix game (in the 
role of the row player) against an anonymous opponent. 63% of the subjects (n=2029) chose WL 
and 37% WR. However, the mixed-strategy solution (independent of the actual rates of L and R) 
is to choose WL with probability ⅓ (cf. Rubinstein, 2006, p. 5). In this case, the opponent (na-
ture) is indifferent about playing LEFT or RIGHT: 
3 / 2 ) ( ; 3 / 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 0 ) ( 0 ) ( 2 ) ( = = ⇒ + = + = WR p WL p WR p WL p WR p WL p Eq  (7) 
Choosing ⅓ WL and ⅔ WR would save an expected earning of ⅔ units per trial in the long run. 
However, subjects deviate completely from that strategy. 
Now a puzzle emerges: Why do the data in Rubinstein (2006) and many other experiments about 
probability matching not correspond to mixed strategies, whereas the data from Davenport 
(1960) on fishery and from Walker and Wooders (2006) about world-class tennis players fit so 14 
well? It seems that learning is relevant, because typically in repeated mixed-strategy games, it 
can be found that people learn adequate strategy mixes. This contrasts with the results about 
probability matching. Walker and Wooders (2006, p. 4) conclude: “Thus, the empirical evidence 
to date indicates that MSE [i.e., mixed-strategy equilibrium M.B.] is effective for explaining and 
predicting behavior in strategic situations at which the competitors are experts and that it is less 
effective when the competitors are novices, as experimental subjects typically are.” These find-
ings suggest that the acquisition of adequate probability mixes in mixed strategies is a conse-
quence of other learning mechanisms and not a consequence of a predefined machinery or mod-
ule in our minds for such purposes. 
Conclusion 
In the context of multi-attribute decision-making, it seems at least worthwhile to take a closer 
look at the social intelligence of homo sapiens and to ask both empirically and theoretically 
whether human evolution adapted decision modules to social situations. Comparing mere indi-
vidual decisions with decisions in social situations introduces at least one more attribute into the 
process of decision-making, because it is not only one’s own outcomes that matter. Instead, the 
outcomes of others also have to be considered – both from a theoretic point of view, by shifting 
from SEU theories to game-theoretic concepts, and from an empirical point of view. In this pa-
per, the question has been raised whether it might be even possible that, when subjects are in a 
situation of individual decision-making, they still decide as if they were in such a social context. 
A consequence of such “biases” is that instead of maximizing the expected value, prudent and 
security-seeking behavior may be adapted, which always takes the worst outcomes into account. 
Mixed strategies generalize such ideas of pure minimax stategies in SEU theories and perform 
(slightly) better. Until now, this theoretic point has been overlooked in psychological research on 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
However, a closer look at empirical data shows that individuals do not coherently use mixed 
strategies. Empirical examples with experts can be found in field research, but empirical results 
from the lab in the context of probability-matching stand in obvious contradiction to this strate-
gic idea. Therefore, there results indicate that individuals and communities adapt to mixed 
strategies after long experience. Such adaptations seem to take place even in games against na-
ture, which theoretically makes sense under the point of view of risk aversion. Bringing to mind 
that the concept of nature as a pure random process is a rather new invention in cultural history, 
compared to the quarrel with gods who intentionally influence our destiny, it seems plausible 
that people often make use of minimax-strategies. It could well be that people adapted to mixed 
strategies due to the evolutionary pressure, without knowledge about probabilities and probabil-
ity mix. SEU would have predicted that people adapt to strategies that maximize the expected 
values, whereas mixed strategies would predict an adaption to strategies that guarantee rather 
constant results that reduce the given uncertainty of the situation. 15 
Therefore, it seems plausible that mixed strategies can be rational even in games against nature. 
But when is it rational and when not? Humans are social beings and are able to co-operate. In the 
context of co-operation, it may be advantageous to use strategies that make the individual pre-
dictable. In situations of competition, mixed strategies that create unpredictability make sense. 
Humans have learned both: to cooperate and to cheat.  
This might also explain why animals perform better in probability-matching tasks than humans 
do (cf. Schul et al., 2007). The authors do also allude to the higher costs of the attempts to under-
stand contingencies as strategic interactions instead of just making use of statistic reasoning. The 
consideration and review on experiments given in my paper have demonstrated that indeed it is 
hard to learn mixed strategies. However, the considerations given here contradict their conclu-
sions that it is the absence of immediate reliable feedback that makes it difficult to learn by sta-
tistic reasoning. The authors claim that statistical reasoning would be more useful for dealing 
with uncertainty than to understand the situation as a strategic interaction. In contradiction to this 
conclusion, here it has been demonstrated that the use of mixed strategies in probability-
matching experiments is very useful, but that it is hard to learn. The paper at hand suggests that 
the social world triggers the learning of elements of mixed strategies, and that experts in com-
petitive settings (like match games) may also be experts in the use of such strategies. However, 
due to the difficulties and long-lasting learning processes, it seems implausible to assume that 
there is a mental tool that directly corresponds to the calculation of mixed strategies. Erev and 
Roth (1998) demonstrate in simulations that reinforcement learning may lead to an adequate 
mixed strategy. Assuming that mixed strategies are learned via the reinforcement-learning mod-
ule, it is obvious that it takes a long time to learn to come close to the  mixed strategy solution, 
and that the use of mixed strategies is associated with expertise. 16 
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